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Abstract: 
We develop a simple framework to show the effects of trade cost reduction on unionized wage, 
employment and domestic welfare when a domestic firm strategically chooses the amount of 
formal in-house production and subcontracting to the informal sector. We show that a lower 
trade cost increases unionized wage and domestic firm’s formal production and employment, and 
reduces its informal production. Free trade maximizes domestic welfare if the trade cost 
represents a transportation cost. However, if the trade cost represents a domestic tariff, the 
domestic welfare maximizing tariff is positive. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
Reduction of international trade cost, either due to the policy choice or due to technological improvement, is 
an important phenomenon in today’s world. However, there is always concern about the winners and the 
loosers of a more liberal trade environment, which has created both theoretical and empirical literature 
analyzing the effects of trade liberalization on unionized wage and employment. While the theoretical 
literature analyzing the effects of trade liberalzation on unionized wage and employment has focused on 
several important aspects, it has ignored an important empirical regularity, viz., the involvement of informal 
sector in the production process. It is often found, particularly in developing countries, that the firms 
undertake formal in-house production and also subcontract with informal producers in the country. Hence, 
while considering the wage and employment effects of trade liberalization, the strategic decision on formal 
and informal productions deserves attention. We address this issue in this paper.  
We develop a simple framework to show the effects of trade cost reduction on unionized wage, 
employment and domestic welfare when a domestic firm strategically chooses the amount of formal in-
house production and subcontracting to the informal sector. We show that a lower trade cost increases 
unionized wage and domestic firm’s formal production and employment, and reduces its informal 
production. Free trade maximizes doemstic welfare if the trade cost represents transportation cost. 
However, if the trade cost represents domestic tariff, the domestic welfare maximizing tariff is positive. 
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1. Introduction 
Reduction of international trade cost, either due to the policy choice or due to 
technological improvement, is an important phenomenon in today’s world. However, 
there is always concern about the winners and the losers of a more liberal trade 
environment, which has created both theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the 
effects of trade liberalization on wage and employment. The effects of international 
trade liberalization on employment and factor prices can be dated back to Stolper and 
Samuelson (1941). However, in earlier days, this issue has been addressed under 
perfectly competitive labour market, which is not always the correct reflection of the 
real world. Often the labour markets are imperfectly competitive due to the presence 
of labour unions, and this has created a recent literature examining the effects of trade 
liberalization on unionized wage and employment. 
Rodrik (1997) points out that globalization reduce the power of the trade 
unions and create an adverse wage effect. This concern is more prominent in Europe, 
where the labour market in most countries is strongly unionized.
1 For example, as 
documented in Niblett (2005), the negative perception in the European Union towards 
increased globalization is an important reason for the rejection of the European 
Constitution by French and Dutch voters. The theoretical results of Huizinga (1993) 
and Sørensen (1993), which show that unionized wage is higher under autarky than 
under free trade, confirm this concern. 
  However, empirical evidences do not support these findings always. There are 
several evidences showing that a trade cost reduction increases unionized wage. 
                                                 
1 As mentiond in OECD (2004), on average, 67% of the workfoce in the European nations are covered 
by union agreements.  Feenstra (2007) finds a substantial improvement in wage earnings in the USA and 
Canada during 1980s and 1990s following tariff reduction. Cragg and Epelbaum 
(1996) observe a high growth of skill wage in Mexico in the phase of tariff reduction 
during 1990s. Aleman-Castilla (2006) shows that Mexican trade opening in the 1990s 
increased industry wage differentials and widened the formal–informal wage gap. 
Based on official information from Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample 
Survey Organisation in India, Maiti and Marjit (2009) register a sharp wage rise in 
both formal and informal sector, by more than three to four times, from 1989-90 to 
2005-06 in the period of economic reform.  
The theoretical works by Naylor (1998 and 1999), Munch and Skaksen (2002), 
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and Bastos et al. (2009) justify the positive effects of 
trade reform on unionized wage. In two-country trade models, Naylor (1998 and 1999) 
show that two-way trade liberalization increases unionized wage. Bastos and 
Kreickemeier (2009) show the effects of two-way trade liberalization in a general 
equilibrium model with unionized and non-unionized sectors. Bastos et al. (2009) 
show that trade liberalization may increase unionized wage by affecting the 
disagreement utility of the firms if the union is an open shop, where all the workers 
are not union members. 
  The theoretical works reviewed above have addressed several important 
aspects of the contemporary world, yet they ignore an important empirical regularity, 
viz., the involvement of informal sector in the production process. It is often found, 
particularly in developing countries, that the firms undertake formal in-house 
production and also subcontract with informal producers in the country. For example, 
it is often the case in Latin American countries such as Brazil (Ulssea, 2010). The 
evidence of rising participation of the informal sector can also be found in other 
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 recent works such as Schneider and Enste (2000), Boeri and Garibaldi (2005), Guha-
Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006) and Mehrotra and Biggeri (2007). As an example, Bata, 
a well-known shoe manufacturer in India, produces in-house and also subcontracts 
with outside producers in the country. Such examples can also be found in other 
industries such as automobile, textile and IT. Hence, while considering the wage and 
employment effects of trade liberalization, the strategic decision on formal and 
informal productions deserves attention. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
work which addresses this issue. This paper is a step to fill this gap.  
We develop a simple framework where a domestic firm decides on formal in-
house production and subcontracting with the informal producers. The in-house wage 
is determined by a labour union, while the informal wage is determined by the 
competitive condition. In this framework, we show the effects of a trade cost 
reduction on unionized wage, and formal and informal activities. We show that a trade 
cost reduction increases in-house unionized wage and domestic firm’s formal 
production and employment, and reduces its informal production. This is due to the 
following two effects. Given the amount of subcontracting, a trade cost reduction 
increases the output of the foreign firm, and reduces the domestic firm’s in-house 
production. Hence, given the amount of subcontracting, a lower trade cost reduces the 
union’s labour demand, thus reducing the domestic firm’s in-house unionized wage. 
This wage effect tends to increase the domestic firm’s incentive for in-house 
production and reduces its incentive for subcontracting. The extent of the competition 
and wage effects determines the net effect of a trade cost reduction on the domestic 
firm’s in-house production, employment and wage. We find that the wage effect, 
which increases production efficiency by reducing the marginal cost of production, 
dominates the competition effect, and a trade cost reduction increases unionized wage 
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 and domestic firm’s in-house production and employment, and reduces its 
subcontracting to the informal sector.  
We also show that zero trade cost maximizes domestic welfare if the trade cost 
represents transportation cost. However, if the trade cost represents domestic tariff, 
the domestic welfare maximizing level of tariff is positive. This result is due to the 
standard rent shifting effect of domestic tariff, which balances the effects of 
competition (which affects domestic profit, consumer surplus and union utility) and 
domestic tariff revenue. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes.  
    
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there are two countries, called domestic and foreign. Each country has 
one firm producing a homogeneous product and competing in the domestic country. 
The firm in the domestic country is called firm 1 and the firm in the foreign country is 
called firm 2. The inverse demand function in the domestic country is , 
where P is price of the product and Q is the total output. 
Q a P − =
  We assume that production requires labour and the domestic firm’s output can 
be produced in-house and/or in the informal sector.
2 For simplicity, we assume that 
one unit of labour is required to produce one unit of output, irrespective of in-house or 
informal production. We consider that there is a labour union which determines firm 
1’s in-house wage rate, w, while considering the competitive age rate as the unionized 
workers reservation wage rate, which is assumed to be zero for simplicity. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Ulyssea (2010) for a work where production process involves both formal and informal 
sectors. 
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 The competitive wage, which is assumed to be zero, prevails in the informal 
sector, thus creating different labour market institutions in the formal and informal 
sectors. Hence, the labour cost for the informal production is zero. However, it is well 
documented that involvement of informal sector also creates transaction and/or 
administrative costs (Ulyssea, 2010). So, the effective unit cost of production in the 
informal sector is the summation of competitive labour cost and the transaction and 
administrative costs. We assume that the constant per-unit transaction and 
administrative costs for informal production is c. Therefore, the effective unit cost of 
production in the informal sector is c. Hence, the trade off for the domestic firm is 
clear. Subcontracting to the informal sector helps to bypass the unionized wage, w, 
but it attracts the transaction and administrative costs (i.e., c) related to informal 
production.  
  We assume for simplicity that that the constant marginal cost of production of 
the foreign firm is zero, yet it needs to incur the per-unit trade cost t, due to 
transportation cost and/or tariff imposed by the domestic country. Hence, the effective 
unit cost of the foreign firm is t. 
  Following Crene and Davidson (2004), which show that a multi-division firm 
can stagger its output decision among different divisions, we consider that the 
domestic firm can stagger its output decision among in-house production and 
outsourcing to the informal sector. More particularly, we consider that the domestic 
firm chooses its output under subcontracting before its in-house production. However, 
the domestic firm and the foreign firm compete like Cournot duopolists. That is, the 
foreign firm cannot observe the output decision of the domestic firm, either under 
subcontracting or under in-house production, yet the foreign firm knows of the 
4 
 domestic firm’s sequence of output decision. Hence, we consider the following 
strategies: 
(1) The foreign firm, i.e., firm 2, chooses   to maximize its profit given its Cournot 
conjecture about the domestic firm’s, i.e., firm 1’s, output decision under in-house 
production,   and subcontracting to the informal sector, which is define by k. 
2 q
1 q
(2) Firm 1 chooses k to maximize its total profit given its Cournot conjecture about 
firm 2’s output choice   and the effect of k on the output choice .  2 q 1 q
(3) After the output decision k, firm 1 decides on   to maximize its total profit given 
its Cournot conjecture about firm 2’s output choice  . 
1 q
q2
(4) The labour union in firm 1 decides wage, w, after firm 1’s decision on k but before 
its decision on . Hence, firm 1’s decision on k influences the unionized wage in firm 
1, thus providing the rationale to firm 1’ decision for dealing with the informal sector, 
i.e., determining k, before its dealing with the in-house labour union, which affects its 
in-house wage and production. 
1 q
  In terms of our analysis, the strategic variables will be determined in the 
following order. Given w, k and , firm 2 will determine   to maximize its profit, 
and given w, k and , firm 1 will determine   to maximize its profit. These profit 
maximizing calculations will determine the labour demand faced by the in-house 
labour union, which will determine w to maximize union utility after taking into 
account this labour demand function. Firm 1 will choose k to maximize its profit by 




2 q 1 q
2 q
   Firms 1 and 2 maximize the following expressions to determine   and   
respectively: 
1 q 2 q
k c k q q a q w k q q a ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 2 1 1 − − − − + − − − − = π          ( 1 )  
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 2 2 1 2 ) ( q t k q q a − − − − = π .             ( 2 )  




w t k a
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− + −







= .              ( 4 )  
Equation (3) provides the labour demand for the in-house labour union. The labour 
demand function or firm 1’s in-house production is inversely related to the amount of 
subcontracting and the union wage but directly related to the trade cost. Equation (4) 
shows that firm 2’s output is directly related to the unionized wage in the domestic 
firm and inversely related to the trade cost. It is interesting to note that the amount of 
subcontracting by the domestic firm does not have direct impact on foreign output. 
This is because the foreign firm considers the total output of the domestic firm, which 
is , as given while taking its output decision.  1 ( kq + )
Now we shall determine the union wage. We consider a right-to-manage 
model of labour union such as in Vannini and Bughin (2000), López and Naylor 
(2004) and Mukherjee (2008), to name a few.
3 We assume that the labour union 
maximizes the following expression to determine w: 
(3 2
3 w
wa k t w
Max
−+ −)
.                          (5) 
The equilibrium wage can be found as 
4
3 t k a
w
+ −
= .             ( 6 )  
                                                 
3 The “efficient bargaining” model, which stipulates that the firms and unions bargain over wages and 
employment, is an alternative to the right-to-manage model. See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in 
favor of right-to-manage models.  
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 The expression (6) confirms that firm 1 can reduce the unionized wage by increasing 
the amount of subcontracting to the informal sector. Equation (6) also shows that 
given the amount of outsourcing, a trade cost reduction reduces the unionized wage. 














= .              ( 8 )  
Finally, firm 1 maximizes the following expression to determine k:  
[( 3 )( 3 ) 3(5 3 5 12 ) ]/36
k Max a k t a k t a k t c k ++ −+ + −+− .        (9) 
The equilibrium amount of subcontracting can be found as  
12
12 5 5 * c t a
k
− +
= .          ( 1 0 )  
Equation (10) shows that a lower trade cost reduces the amount of subcontracting by 
firm 1 to the informal sector. Hence, a trade cost reduction creates the following trade 
off. Given k, a lower t reduces w. However, a lower t also reduces k, which tends to 
increase w. The net effect will depend on these effects.  
Using the equilibrium value of k, we get the equilibrium w,   and   as  1 q 2 q
16
12 * t a c
w
− −







=          ( 1 2 )  
16





= .          ( 1 3 )  










= , i.e., firm 2 exports if .  
* t t <

















Therefore, the prohibitive trade cost is 
11
) 4 5 ( * t
c a+
=  and firm 2 exports if . ■  
* tt <
 










<  and 
it does not produce in-house if . Firm 1 produces in-house and also 
subcontracts if
12 tc >− a
(12 5 )










c > , the results follow immediately from (10), (12) and (13). ■ 
 
The reason for the above result is as follows. If t is sufficiently high, the 
domestic firm faces less competition from foreign firm and captures larger market 
share. In this situation, the high demand for labour increases the in-house unionized 
wage significantly, thus making in-house production unprofitable compared to 
subcontracting, and firm 1 subcontract completely. On the other hand, if t is very 
small, the lower market share of firm 1 creates low demand for labour and reduces the 
unionized wage significantly. In this situation, firm 1 prefers to produce in-house, 
since the cost under subcontracting is higher than the in-house cost. For intermediate 
values of t, firm 1 produces in-house and also subcontracts to balance the unionized 
wage and the cost of subcontracting. 




c >  is that, if it does not hold, all three 
possible production strategies of firm 1, which is shown in Proposition 1, cannot 
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c  no subcontracting by firm 1 cannot be an 





ca < .  <
 
Proposition 2: A trade cost reduction increases both in-house output (and therefore, 
employment) of firm 1 and the in-house unionized wage.  
Proof: The results follow immediately from (11) and (12). ■ 
 
The reason for the above result is as follows. If t declines, given the amount of 
subcontracting to the informal sector, it increases output of the foreign firm, and 
lowers the in-house production of the domestic firm. As a result, given the amount of 
subcontracting, a lower t reduces the labour demand faced by the union, thus reducing 
the unionized wage. Hence, the competition effect following a trade cost reduction 
creates a wage effect, which increases the domestic firm’s incentive for in-house 
production and reduces its incentive for subcontracting. This wage effect tends to 
increase firm 1’s in-house labour demand and the unionized wage. We find that the 
wage effect dominates the competition effect, and the net effect of a lower t is to 
increase the labour demand faced by the in-house labour union, thus increasing in-
house employment and the unionized wage. Hence, an implication of our result is that 
trade liberalization increases formal employment by reducing domestic firm’s 
informal activity. 
At this point, it may worth discussing the reason for considering the particular 
sequence of firm 1’s production in our analysis. It follows from the above analysis 
that if firm 1 determines the amount of subcontracting before the in-house production, 
it can reduce the unionized wage below c. However, if firm 1 considered in-house 
9 
 production before subcontracting, the unionized wage rate could be reduced up to c, 
since, in this situation, c could act as firm 1’s alternative marginal cost of production. 
Hence, by considering the amount of subcontracting before in-house production, firm 
1 could strengthen the unionized wage reducing effect of subcontracting. 






c > . 
(i) If the trade cost represents transportation cost, domestic welfare is maximized at 
.   0 t =









* [0, ] tt ∈ . 
Proof: (i) If the trade cost represents transportation cost, welfare of the domestic 
country consists of the profits of firm 1, consumer surplus and union utility, and is 
given by 
2 22 (3 4 3 )(12 ) (5 12 5 ) (11 5 4 ) (12 )
192 512 384
act c a t a ct atc c a t
W
⎡⎤ −+ − − + − + −− − − ⎣⎦ =+ + .  
(14) 
We get that domestic welfare is convex with respect to t, attaining a minimum at 
255
15 308 a c
t
−




c > , which ensures that all three production 
strategies of firm 1 can be the equilibrium outcomes, straightforward calculation 
shows that 




c > . Hence, a lower transportation cost increases domestic 
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 welfare for   if 





c ∈ ) a , implying that domestic welfare is maximized at 






c∈ ) , we get 
* tt < , and a lower transportation cost 
reduces welfare for 
* (, ) tt t ∈ . We find that domestic welfare at t = 0 is greater than 
the domestic welfare at  , which implies that domestic welfare is maximized at 
zero transportation cost.  
* tt =
(ii) If the trade cost represents domestic tariff, the tariff revenue would also affect 
domestic welfare. In this situation, domestic welfare is 






















= , where 
* [0, ] tt ∈ . Hence, if the trade cost represents domestic tariff, 
the domestic welfare maximizing tariff is positive. ■ 
 
Intuitively, the above result can be explained as follows. For Proposition 3(i), 
if t falls, domestic competition increases, which increases consumer surplus and union 
utility
4 but reduces the domestic firm’s profit. We get that the significant gains in 
consumer surplus and union utility help to maximize the domestic welfare at t = 0. 
Proposition 3(ii) is due to the standard reason for optimal tariff in an imperfectly 
                                                 
4 Consumer surplus and union utility are given by 









 competitive product market. Since the tariff revenue is a component of the domestic 
welfare, the rent shifting effect of domestic tariff makes the domestic welfare 
maximizing tariff positive. The optimal tariff balances the effect of tariff on 
competition (which affects consumer surplus, domestic profit and union utility) and 
riff revenue.  
 
ects of a trade cost 
reducti




There are two important developments in the contemporary world. On the one hand, 
the growth of trade cost reduction creates the concern about its effects on wage and 
employment in the liberalized country. On the other hand, it is found that firms, 
particularly in developing countries, are engaged in both formal and informal 
activities. So far, the literature did not pay attention to these aspects together. This 
paper fills this gap in the literature, and shows the strategic eff
on on unionized wage, employment and informal activity. 
We show that trade cost reduction increases unionized wage and domestic 
firm’s formal production and employment, and reduces its informal production. The 
factor attributable to our results is the domestic firm’s strategic output choice between 
formal production and subcontracting to the informal sector, which has been 
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